




The effects of groups' variety and disparity on groups' cognitive complexity
Curseu, P.L.; Schruijer, S.G.L.; Boros, S.
Published in:
Group Dynamics: Theory, Research and Practice
Publication date:
2007
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Curseu, P. L., Schruijer, S. G. L., & Boros, S. (2007). The effects of groups' variety and disparity on groups'
cognitive complexity. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research and Practice, 11(3), 187-206.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. Jan. 2022








This study examined the influence of group diversity conceptualized as disparity and as
variety on group cognitive complexity. Data on individual cognitive complexity and
group cognitive complexity were collected in 44 groups using a conceptual mapping
technique. Also data on the quality of teamwork processes and satisfaction were
collected using an individual questionnaire. The results indicate that (a) gender variety
has a positive impact on group cognitive complexity, (b) cognitive disparity has a
negative impact on group cognitive complexity, and (c) groups with a high average
individual cognitive complexity have the highest cognitive complexity as a group only
if the quality of their interactions is high.
Keywords: cognitive mapping, cognitive complexity, group dynamics
In modern organizations, complex cognitive
tasks ranging from decision making to strategy
development are generally given to groups
rather than individuals (Cooke, Kiekel, Salas,
Stout, Bowers, & Cannon Bowers, 2003;
Devine, 2002; Weber & Donahue, 2001). It is
believed that groups can use a greater pool of
knowledge to tackle complex information-
processing tasks and be more effective than
individuals. Therefore, the diversity in knowl-
edge resources is a strategic advantage. How-
ever, whether “n” different heads are always
better than “n” similar ones is still a matter of
debate. This issue has been extensively investi-
gated in the group diversity literature. It is ar-
gued that in order for a team to be effective it
has to successfully integrate the individual
knowledge of its members. This process was
labeled as knowledge integration by Okhuysen
and Eisenhardt (2002), as the elaboration of
task information by Van Knippenberg, De
Dreu, and Homan (2004), or as group cognitive
complexity by Curşeu (2006).
In this article, we will further on use the term
group cognitive complexity to define the rich-
ness of the collective knowledge structures that
emerge as a team-level phenomenon from the
integration of individual specialized knowledge
through interpersonal interactions (Curşeu,
2006). Group cognitive complexity is an essen-
tial characteristic of group cognition. Although
most of group cognition scholars agree that
group cognition is a group-level phenomenon
that emerges from the interplay between the
individual cognitions of group members and
their interactions (Rentsch & Woehr, 2004;
Salas & Fiore, 2004), there is little emphasis in
the literature on the emergence of group cogni-
tion as a group-level phenomenon (Curşeu,
2006).
Also, in the diversity literature questions con-
cerning what types of attributes are more likely
to be beneficial for group cognitive complexity
or under which conditions a diverse group can
effectively use the variety of knowledge and
expertise of its members, remain largely unan-
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swered (Milliken & Martins, 1996; Williams &
O’Reilly, 1998). Several taxonomic approaches
have been used to make sense of the puzzling
effects of group diversity on group performance
(Pelled, 1996; Harrison & Klein, 2007) starting
from the assumption that different types of di-
versity yield different effects on performance.
Harrison and Klein (2007) argue that group
diversity can be operationalized as separation
(e.g., differences in opinions among the group
members), variety (e.g., differences in types of
knowledge or experience among the group
members), or disparity (e.g., differences in as-
sets or resources among the group members),
and only variety will foster a higher pool of
knowledge within a group. This taxonomic ap-
proach has good potential for explaining the
mixed effects of group diversity on group per-
formance because on the one hand it accommo-
dates for other existing taxonomies (e.g., Pelled,
1996; Milliken & Martins, 1996) and on the
other hand it connects each diversity type with
the underlying mechanisms of group perfor-
mance (Harrison & Klein, 2007).
The first aim of this article is to explore the
role of group interaction processes on groups’
cognitive complexity. We argue that the quality
of interpersonal interactions in a group is central
for the integration of individual knowledge
structures (individual cognition) into a group
knowledge structure (group cognition) and that
the quality of teamwork moderates the relation
between the average individual cognitive com-
plexity and group cognitive complexity. The
second aim is to use the taxonomy introduced
by Harrison and Klein (2007) to explore the
differential impact of group disparity and vari-
ety on group cognitive complexity.
We extend existing research in several ways.
First, the article contributes to the group diver-
sity debates and provides an empirical test for
the theoretical propositions raised by the dis-
tinction between disparity and variety as types
of group diversity. According to these proposi-
tions, cognitive disparity is illustrative for the
vertical differentiation within groups and is ex-
pected to have a negative impact, while variety
is illustrative for a horizontal differentiation
within groups and has a positive impact on
group cognitive complexity. Second, the article
adds to the group cognition literature by explor-
ing the role of interpersonal interactions within
a group on the emergence of group cognition
(operationalized as a group’s cognitive com-
plexity). Finally, the article sheds some light on
the impact of group disparity on group mem-
bers’ satisfaction. We will start by shortly re-
viewing the literature on group cognitive com-
plexity as well as on group diversity with an
emphasis on cognitive diversity.
Cognitive Complexity in Groups and the
Meaning of Collaboration
The concept of cognitive complexity (CC)
has initially been introduced by Bieri (1955) as
a personality trait and has subsequently been
researched within the framework of personal
construct theories (Kelly, 1955). Later it has
been redefined as a characteristic of information
processing in cognitive systems (Schroder,
Driver, & Streufert, 1967). CC refers to the
complexity of the knowledge structures in a
cognitive system, and it describes the sophisti-
cation of those cognitive structures that are used
for organizing and storing cognitive contents
(Kelly, 1955; Goodwin, Wofford, & Harrison,
1990; Curşeu & Rus, 2005). High CC reflects a
flexible and adaptive orientation in information
processing (Schroder et al., 1967).
Groups are sociocognitive systems (Curşeu,
2003; Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997; Hollan,
Hutchins, & Kirsch, 2000; Hutchins, 1995).
They develop, store, and use cognitive repre-
sentations (Curşeu, 2003). Because cognitive
systems can vary in complexity on a continuum
ranging from cognitive simplicity to cognitive
complexity (Schroder et al., 1967), the concept
of cognitive complexity can also be applied to
groups as a characteristic of group cognition.
According to the group cognition approaches
(Curşeu, 2003; Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997;
Hollan et al., 2000; Hutchins, 1995; Mohammed,
Klimoski, & Rentsch, 2000; Rentsch & Woehr,
2004; Weick & Roberts, 1993), group cognition
depends on the knowledge of individual group
members as well as on their interaction processes.
One empirical study (Hendrick, 1979) sug-
gests that the individual cognitive complexity of
group members has a positive effect on group
processes and performance. He found that
groups composed of cognitively complex indi-
viduals used information cues more efficiently,
interacted more easily, and came up with cor-
rect solutions for a puzzle faster than groups
whose members were low on cognitive com-
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plexity. Nonetheless, Hendrick (1979) did not
investigate the cognitive complexity of the
group as a whole and did not take into account
the interactions among group members. The
cognitive complexity was measured only at the
individual level, not at the group level. Only his
inferences regarding performance pertain to the
group level. By ignoring the interactions be-
tween group members, Hendrick (1979) did not
conceptualize the group as a social system but
rather as an addition of individuals varying in
cognitive complexity. In real groups interper-
sonal interactions play a crucial role in the de-
velopment of group cognition, and to date there
is little empirical evidence for the interplay be-
tween teamwork processes and the cognitive
complexity of the group members in generating
group cognition (Curşeu & Rus, 2005).
Although group cognitive complexity was
previously discussed in relation to group perfor-
mance—as the elaboration of task relevant in-
formation (Van Knippenberg et al., 2004)
or knowledge integration (Okhuysen &
Eisenhardt, 2002)—no clear operationalization
and measurement of the these concepts as a
group-level phenomenon was developed. In the
present study, group cognitive complexity is
operationalized as the number of independent
concepts used by the group to define (represent)
a particular situation or knowledge domain and
the number and variety of connections among
these concepts (Curşeu & Rus, 2005). This op-
erationalization is consistent with the definition
of cognitive complexity in cognitive systems in
general. In a cognitive system characterized by
high cognitive complexity, information process-
ing is defined by the use of many constructs
with many relations among them (Schroder et
al., 1967). The cognitive complexity of the
group is domain specific: groups can be cogni-
tively complex in some areas and cognitively
simple in others. Therefore, group cognitive
complexity describes the richness of the knowl-
edge representations held by the group for a
particular knowledge domain.
One possibility for groups to represent de-
clarative knowledge is through natural lan-
guage. Conceptual networks are therefore cen-
tral representation forms. A conceptual network
is a graphical representation, which consists of
several interconnected concepts that the group
uses to make sense of a task. Although various
approaches have been used to represent group
cognition, the most frequently reported tech-
nique has been cognitive mapping (Axelrod,
1976; Bougon, 1983; Huff, 1990). The com-
plexity of the group’s cognitive map is illustra-
tive for the cognitive complexity of the group.
Most of the studies use aggregation methods
to combine individual cognitions into shared
mental models (Cooke, Salas, Cannon-Bowers,
& Stout, 2000; Cooke et al., 2004; Lagan-Fox,
Code, & Langfield-Smith, 2000; Mohammed,
Klimoski, & Rentsch, 2000). However, as ar-
gued, group cognition is a group-level phenom-
enon, and any evaluation method must (1) ad-
dress the group as a whole, (2) demonstrate
group members’ agreement with regard to the
evaluated construct, (3) demonstrate that the
results discriminate across groups, and (4) re-
flect group interaction processes (see for more
details Bar-Tal, 1990). A simple aggregation of
individual mental models does not satisfy all
four criteria. However, cognitive mapping can
be adapted to meet the four criteria. A card-
sorting technique is suitable for such a purpose.
Relevant concepts for the knowledge domain of
the group (to be elicited by interview, document
analysis, verbal protocol analysis—see for de-
tails Carley, 1993, 1997; Mohammed et al.,
2000) are to be written on independent cards,
and then the group members are instructed to
organize them in a way that makes sense to the
group as a whole. This method can be used to
study the structure of the conceptual networks
developed by groups at the group level of anal-
ysis.
In this study we use such a modified cogni-
tive mapping technique to understand how in-
dividuals and groups make sense of the concept
of “collaboration.” Thus, we elicit conceptual
networks about the phenomenon of collabora-
tion. When it is used as a group task, the group
members have to reach consensus on the struc-
ture of the conceptual network that best repre-
sents the group as a whole (Curşeu, 2003;
Curşeu & Rus, 2005). Although this consensus
based method reflects the group as a whole (it
satisfies all the requirements stated by Bar-Tal,
1990, for valid holistic evaluation methods), we
have to acknowledge, in line with Sundstrom,
Busby, and Bobrow (1997), the fact that reach-
ing consensus in this particular task does not
necessarily mean complete unanimity (the tech-
nique might involve compromises among the
group members). We will further address the
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issue of computing the complexity of cognitive
maps in the section on procedure.
Group Diversity
Group diversity refers to the degree of differ-
entiation that exists among the group members
with respect to a particular attribute (Harrison &
Klein, 2007). Although during the last de-
cades, group diversity received a considerable
amount of interest (Weber & Donahue, 2001;
van Knippenberg et al., 2004), scholars still
disagree if group diversity is beneficial or not
for group performance (Milliken & Martins,
1996; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). It is gener-
ally believed that heterogeneous groups are
more creative and reach better decisions, yet
experience more difficult group interaction pro-
cesses (suboptimal communication, conflict,
stereotyping) than homogeneous groups. How-
ever, homogeneous groups solve problems
more quickly, are more cohesive, and group
members are more satisfied with their coopera-
tion (Milliken & Martins, 1996; Williams &
O’Reilly, 1998; Weber & Donahue, 2001).
Research on group diversity addressed a large
variety of attributes, from demographic (e.g.,
age, gender) to cognitive ones (e.g., attitudes,
values), and currently several diversity at-
tributes taxonomies exist. The most used ones
distinguish between visible versus less visible
attributes (Milliken & Martins, 1996) and be-
tween highly job-related versus less job-related
attributes (Pelled, 1996). The first taxonomy
(visible vs. less visible attributes) emerged from
reviews of the group diversity literature, and it
does not describe the mechanisms that connect
group diversity with performance, while the
second was developed starting from mecha-
nisms that could explain the differential impact
of diversity on performance, yet it received little
to no empirical support (Weber & Donahue,
2001).
More recently, Harrison and Klein (2007)
introduced a new distinction. They differentiate
between group diversity as separation (differ-
ences in beliefs, attitudes, and values), variety
(differences in functional background and type
of expertise) and disparity (inequalities in sta-
tus, power, and resource availability). Of all
these types, only variety is expected to have a
positive influence on group effectiveness
(Harrison & Klein, 2007). Separation refers to
differences in the lateral disposition of the
group members on a continuum defined by a
certain diversity trait. Separation reflects a bi-
modal distribution, with half of group members
at the highest (e.g., they have strong similar
religious beliefs), the other at lowest endpoints
of the considered variable’s continuum (e.g.,
they have no religious beliefs). Variety refers to
the composition of differences in kind, source
or category of relevant knowledge or experience
among group members. It reflects a uniform
distribution with an even spread of members
across all possible categories of a variable (e.g.,
a group high on variety is a group composed of
psychologists, sociologists and anthropolo-
gists). Disparity refers to the composition of
(vertical) differences in proportion of socially
valued assets or resources held among group
members, pointing to an inequality or relative
concentration. Disparity reflects a positively
skewed distribution with one member at the
highest point on the continuum (one member
that has access to a particular form of resource,
like money, knowledge, or expertise) of the
considered variable, others at the lowest (most
of the members have no access to the previously
mentioned resources) (Harrison & Klein, 2007).
The taxonomy introduced by Harrison and
Klein (2007) opens new ways of looking at
group diversity. The same attribute, gender for
example can be understood as variety (e.g., if
group members have different task related
knowledge structures emerging from qualita-
tively different gender-specific life experi-
ences), disparity (e.g., if the most powerful per-
son in a group of several women and one man is
the man), or separation (e.g., if all women in a
group are feminist and all men are misogynists).
The complexity of group cognition (group’s
cognitive complexity or elaboration of task rel-
evant information) is the linking pin between
group diversity and group performance, or as
Cooke et al. (2003) stated, the cognitive under-
pinnings of group performance. From the types
of diversity described by Harrison and Klein
(2007) only variety has a positive impact on the
elaboration of task relevant information, while
disparity has disruptive effects.
Group variety is associated with a larger
knowledge repertoire which will ultimately be
reflected in the complexity of the cognitive map
produced by the group. There is, however, the
requirement that the variety of knowledge
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group members have should be relevant for the
task (Schruijer & Vansina, 1997). This require-
ment is also supported by the meta-analysis by
Bower, Pharmer, and Salas (2000) who showed
that the advantages of group heterogeneity are
strictly dependent on the task. The specific task
used in this study is to elicit cognitive maps
about the concept of collaboration. Gender di-
versity is certainly related to this particular task
and can be conceptualized as variety. The deci-
sion quality is higher in gender mixed groups
due to the qualitatively different contributions
to teamwork men and women have (Rogelberg
& Rumery, 1996); therefore, it is expected that
when mapping collaboration men and women
will contribute with different knowledge struc-
tures rooted in different life experiences with
collaboration.
Group disparity on the other hand is more
likely to trigger misunderstandings and conflicts
and will have a negative impact on the com-
plexity of the cognitive map of the group. Few
attempts have been made to study the diversity
of the groups in terms of the content and struc-
ture of the cognitive representations held by
individual members. Knowledge and expertise
is certainly a relevant resource for groups, es-
pecially when they have to perform cognitive
tasks. Therefore, the complexity of members’
understanding of the issue at hand is a key
aspect of group disparity. The disparity attribute
we consider in this study is the complexity of
the individual cognitive map group members
have about collaboration.
Hypotheses
The efficiency of groups (operationalized as
the time needed to complete a cognitive-
mapping task) is generally less than that of
individuals. However, we expect that when
making decisions or discussing a relevant issue
(e.g., the meaning of collaboration), people with
similar cognitive structures reach consensus
faster than groups consisting of people with
different cognitive structures. Based on this, it is
predicted that both group variety and disparity
will have a positive impact on the time needed
to reach consensus within the group. However,
under the conditions of high cognitive disparity
(one group member with a complex knowledge
structure and the others with simple cognitive
structures), the conversion theory of minority
influence (Moscovici, 1980) suggests that most
probably the informed or expert minority (in
this case the member with a complex knowl-
edge structure) will lead the group toward a
deeper information processing of the issue at
hand and a greater cognitive activity in the
group. To reconcile the different perspectives,
the group needs time and, as argued by Harrison
and Klein (2007), disparity is also likely to be
associated with process losses. Because of that,
it is expected that group diversity as disparity
will have a stronger impact on the length of
group discussions (time to reach consensus)
than group diversity as variety.
Hypothesis 1: Both disparity and variety
will have a positive impact on the length of time
needed to reach consensus in groups with dis-
parity having the strongest effect.
However, the criterion for effectiveness is not
the time needed to reach consensus, but the
volume of knowledge pooled during group dis-
cussions. Groups of people with different back-
grounds (high group variety) are expected to
construct more complex conceptual networks or
cognitive maps than homogeneous groups
(Curşeu, 2003; Harrison & Klein, 2007). As
argued in the previous section, group diversity
as variety is expected to have a positive impact
on the cognitive complexity of groups, in the
sense that the pool of knowledge within the
group will be higher in groups composed of
members with different types of experiences
and expertise (cognitively diverse groups),
while group diversity as disparity will have the
opposite effect on group cognitive complexity.
Therefore, it is anticipated that group diversity
will only be beneficial for group cognitive com-
plexity if it is reflected by the variety in per-
spectives that are highly relevant for the task.
The attributes that ensure greater information
richness and variety within groups may differ.
Members with different educational back-
grounds or with different types of expertise are
likely to use their differences in perspectives,
ensuring a higher cognitive complexity of the
group. Most of the studies concerning the ef-
fects of demographic diversity dealt with indi-
vidual level consequences (low satisfaction,
high turnover; see for details, Sacco & Schmitt,
2005). However, demographic diversity is
sometimes an accurate proxy for less visible
differences (e.g., knowledge, experiences) that
are in fact relevant for the task. In a policy
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development group for racial issues, for exam-
ple, racial diversity will be closely associated
with group variety, and due to a greater infor-
mational richness, it will ultimately be benefi-
cial for the group outcomes. A diverse group
with respect to gender will also have a higher
cognitive complexity if the task requires a va-
riety of knowledge that emerges from gender
specific experiences. A similar argument holds
for collaboration. Gender is a task-relevant di-
versity attribute because men and women have
different experiences with and attitudes toward
collaboration (see, e.g., the results concerning
gender differences in negotiations, Stuhlmacher
& Walters, 1999). In this respect, gender diver-
sity can be conceptualized as variety and ex-
pected to have a positive impact on a group’s
cognitive complexity.
Further, there is evidence showing that mixed
gender groups generate a higher number of al-
ternatives and that they discuss a higher number
of ideas (Schruijer & Mostert, 1997), and they
are more creative (Hoffman & Maier, 1961) as
compared to homogeneous groups. Also in
mixed gender groups the quality of decisions is
higher than in homogeneous gender groups due
to the qualitatively different contributions to
teamwork men and women have (Rogelberg &
Rumery, 1996). Because the cognitive com-
plexity of groups also depends on the number of
issues discussed, as well as on the quality of
teamwork, these results support the prediction
that gender diversity will be beneficial for the
cognitive complexity of groups (in this case the
conceptual network of collaboration). To sum-
marize, according to previous research, gender
diversity (1) can be understood as variety, and
(2) it is beneficial for group creativity; there-
fore, our prediction is that in tasks that require a
variety of informational resources that are one
way or another associated to gender-specific
traits, gender variety has a positive impact on a
group’s cognitive complexity.
Hypothesis 2: Gender variety has a posi-
tive impact on the cognitive complexity of
groups.
Group disparity, however, is expected to
have a different impact on a group’s cognitive
complexity. Group diversity conceptualized as
disparity involves an asymmetry within a group
concerning the distribution of valued assets,
with few group members having a particular
asset and the majority of group members not
possessing it (Harrison & Klein, 2007). If few
members within a group have a high level of
expertise or, in a more general sense, a high
level of cognitive complexity, while the major-
ity of the group members have a low level of
cognitive complexity (high disparity), the cog-
nitive complexity of the group will be also low.
A similar argument holds for the diversity in
individual cognitive complexity (further re-
ferred to as cognitive disparity). If only one
member in a group has a highly complex con-
ceptual network for collaboration, it is very
likely that he or she will try to persuade the
others to accept his or her perspective on the
issue (see, e.g., the research on minority influ-
ence, Moscovici, 1980; Wood et al., 1994).
Therefore, it is expected that the general com-
plexity of the conceptual network developed by
the group will be rather low, reflecting mostly
one perspective on collaboration.
Hypothesis 3: Group cognitive disparity
has a negative impact on group cognitive com-
plexity.
Cognitive disparity will most probably influ-
ence the individual group members as well. It
seems reasonable to argue that such asymmetry
in cognitive complexity will frustrate the mem-
bers with a higher cognitive complexity; they
will perceive the individual contributions to the
group task as unequal, and they will be less
satisfied with group processes and outcomes
than members with a low cognitive complexity.
Hypothesis 4: Group members with a
higher CC than the group’s CC will be less
satisfied about the quality of teamwork as com-
pared with members with a lower individual CC
than the group’s CC.
Hypothesis 5: Participation on the task will
be perceived as less equal by group members
with a higher individual CC than the group’s
CC as compared with members with a lower
individual CC than the group’s CC.
The individual cognitive complexity of the
group members is expected to have a positive
influence on a group’s cognitive complexity. In
line with the empirical results reported by
Hendrick (1979), we argue here for a direct and
positive impact of average individual cognitive
complexity on group’s cognitive complexity.
The higher the cognitive complexity of individ-
ual group members, the higher the group’s cog-
nitive complexity will be. However, group cog-
nitive complexity is more than just an aggrega-
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tion of individual cognitive complexities. Group
interactions (debates, negotiations, discussions)
can shape and reshape the content and structure
of the group’s conceptual network (or cognitive
map), and new patterns of connections among
concepts might emerge (which cannot be cap-
tured through a simple aggregation of individ-
ual cognitive maps; Curşeu, 2003; Curşeu &
Rus, 2005). It is therefore reasonable to argue
that groups with a high quality of interpersonal
interactions (further on referred to as high team-
work quality—see for details Hoegl &
Gemuenden, 2001) will benefit the most from
their members’ level of cognitive complexity.
In conclusion, we predict that teamwork quality
will have a moderating effect on the relation
between the average individual cognitive com-
plexity within a group and the group’s cognitive
complexity.
Hypothesis 6: The teamwork quality moder-
ates the relation between the average individual
cognitive complexity and the group cognitive
complexity, in the sense that the positive effect
of average individual cognitive complexity on
group cognitive complexity will be accentuated




A sample of 132 students (with an average
age of 20.16 years; 74 women and 58 men)
participated in a cognitive mapping session in
exchange for extra credits for a social psychol-
ogy course. Only students with previous group-
work experience were used as respondents in
our sample. First individually and then in
groups of two, three, or four, the students were
asked to select from 40 concepts those that
according to them are related to collaboration
and subsequently to organize them in a way that
makes sense to them. Students were grouped in
homogeneous (14 male groups and 15 female
groups) and heterogeneous (15) groups. After
realizing the group maps, the participants were
asked to fill in a questionnaire evaluating satis-
faction, equal participation to the group out-
come, and teamwork quality (communication,
collaboration, planning, organizing, conflict,
and process efficiency).
Procedure
We used a card-sorting variant of a concep-
tual mapping technique to explore the way in
which individuals and groups represent collab-
oration. Collaboration is a concept that suits the
context of this study because the task content
requires a variety of knowledge that is associ-
ated with demographic attributes (e.g., gender-
specific experiences with collaboration are a
relevant source of variety for this particular
task). Another conjecture behind the use of this
concept is that the concept of collaboration and
its links to other relevant concepts can be rep-
resented as a network. Students build a concep-
tual network, in which the relevant concepts are
represented as nodes and the relations among
them are represented as lines (Bougon, 1983;
Calori, Johnson, & Sarnin, 1994). This concep-
tual mapping technique is particularly relevant
for our research because of its vast potential to
encompass complex relations and interdepen-
dencies in a conceptual domain.
In order to obtain the concepts to be used in
the conceptual mapping, we first interviewed
five students about their experiences with col-
laboration. We then used a free association
technique to elicit the main concepts related to
collaboration from an independent sample of 80
students. In this way we made sure that we
found the most relevant concepts used by this
particular group (students) to define collabora-
tion. From the interview and from the free as-
sociation task, the 40 most important concepts
were selected. A list of the concepts ranked
according to their frequency in the free associ-
ation task is presented in Appendix A. Given
the fact that the respondents had to map the
concepts twice and fill in two questionnaires,
the time span of the study was of critical im-
portance. Forty concepts can be mapped in a
reasonable amount of time (around 40 minutes),
and in the same time they give a sufficient
richness of the conceptual domain to be
mapped. Every concept was written on a differ-
ent card. The respondents received an envelope
with the 40 concepts and an A3 blank sheet of
paper and glue. Their task was to distribute the
concepts on the sheet in such a manner that their
spatial proximity would reflect the extent to
which they were related. Afterwards, they were
instructed to draw the connections they see
among the concepts and to specify the nature of
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the relations between concepts. The respondents
were instructed to use only the concepts that
according to them describe or are related to
collaboration; therefore, the decision on how
many concepts are relevant for collaboration
and need to be included in the cognitive map
was made by each individual or group.
The complexity of 132 individual and 44
group cognitive maps was investigated using
three indicators: (1) map connectivity, a count
of the number of connections established be-
tween the concepts, (2) map diversity, a count
of the number of distinct types of relations
established between the concepts (a list and
description of possible types of relations among
concepts is presented in Appendix B—see for
details also Gómez, Moreno, Pazos, & Sierra-
Alonso, 2000), and (3) the number of concepts
used in the map. We computed the map com-
plexity index based on the following formula:
complexity  (connectivity*diversity)/number
of concepts (for details, see Curşeu & Rus,
2005). For an illustration on how cognitive map
complexity was computed see Appendix C.
This formula reflects the embeddedness of the
concepts in the conceptual network at hand;
therefore, it illustrates the richness of the con-
ceptual knowledge structure developed by
groups about collaboration (as it is specified in
the definition of cognitive complexity). Previ-
ous empirical research shows that the cognitive
complexity of student groups (evaluated by this
formula) positively and significantly correlates
with the general performance of the group (the
group grade for the project from which the con-
cepts to be mapped were extracted), with the num-
ber of ideas exchanged during group discus-
sions, with the perceived effectiveness of the
group as well as with the quality of teamwork
(Curşeu, 2003). Finally, as argued before, the
cognitive mapping method meets the validity
criteria discussed by Bar-Tal (1990) for holistic
evaluation methods in group research.
Questionnaire
Group members’ satisfaction with the group,
perceived equal participation to the group out-
come, and teamwork quality (collaboration, or-
ganizing, conflict, and process efficiency) were
evaluated with an individual questionnaire com-
pleted after the group cognitive mapping ses-
sion.
Satisfaction was evaluated using two items
(“How satisfied are you with the group pro-
cess?” and “How satisfied are you with the
outcome of the group?”), rated on a 5-point
Likert scale (from 1 to 5). Cronbach’s alpha for
this scale is 0.83.
Equal participation to the group map was
evaluated with four items designed specially for
the cognitive mapping session (e.g., “The final
map reflects the ideas expressed by all group
members,” “All group members participated
equally in creating the group cognitive map,”
“My ideas are reflected in the final product of
the group,” and “The ideas of all group mem-
bers were incorporated into the final group
map”), rated on a 5-point Likert scale (from 1 to
5). Cronbach’s alpha for this scale is 0.79.
The quality of teamwork processes was eval-
uated using four items (rated on a 5-point Likert
scale, from 1 to 5) related to collaboration,
organizing, conflict, and process efficiency. Pre-
vious research emphasized the unitary factor
structure of the scales evaluating different facets
of teamwork (Curşeu, 2003; Eby, Meade,
Parisi, & Douthitt, 1999; Hoegl & Gemuenden,
2001). The content of the items was developed
using examples from Eby, Meade, Parisi, and
Douthitt (1999) and Hoegl and Gemuenden
(2001). Consequently, the four items were used
together to evaluate teamwork quality. Cron-
bach’s alpha for this scale is 0.82, with the item
evaluating conflict being reverse coded.
A principal components analysis of the scale
revealed a unitary factor structure (similar to
previous research Curşeu, 2003; Eby, Meade,
Parisi, & Douthitt, 1999; Hoegl & Gemuenden,
2001), explaining 70% of the variance with the
following factor loadings: Conflict .70 (“How
often did members of your group disagree or
expressed different opinions in the group?”—
reverse coding), Collaboration .83 (“Group
members collaborated well and worked together
interdependently to achieve the task”), Organiz-
ing .90 (“Group activities were well orga-
nized”), and Process efficiency .86 (“The group
used effective processes to achieve the task”).
In order to justify aggregation of individual
scores into group scores, we used the procedure
introduced by James, Demaree, and Wolf
(1984) to estimate the interrater reliability (the
index of agreement within groups). The within
group agreement index (Rwg) can take values
between 0 and 1, and generally, a value of 0.70
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or higher is considered to reflect a reasonable
amount of agreement within a group (James,
Demaree, & Wolf, 1984). Table 1 summarizes
the Rwg for each variable, with the maximum,
minimum, mean, and the standard deviation of
the Rwg scores.
After the within-group agreement was com-
puted and verified, the individual scores of the
group members were aggregated into group
scores by computing the group mean.
Group Diversity
The diversity index for gender was computed
using a formula proposed by Teachman (1980)
and widely used in group diversity literature
(Williams & Meân, 2004). The formula is:




where i represents a particular category, s is the
total number of categories, and Pi is the propor-
tion of the members belonging to the i category.
If a group consists of members belonging to s
categories, and Pi probability is assigned to a
given category, then the H index is a measure of
group heterogeneity (structural diversity). The
higher the value of the index, the higher is the
variety of the group. The theoretical maximum
for H depends on the total number of categories
(s; Williams & Meân, 2004). Since gender is a
dichotomous variable, we only had two catego-
ries in our formula. For groups consisting of
only one category, H  0. This way of com-
puting group diversity is consistent with the
conceptualization of group diversity as variety
(see for details, Harrison & Klein, 2007).
Cognitive disparity within groups was com-
puted using the coefficient of variation. Accord-
ing to Harrison and Klein (2007) the coefficient
of variation is a suitable method for computing
group disparity. It is computed by dividing the
standard deviation with the group average cog-
nitive complexity. It reaches a maximum when
n-1 group members are at the lower end of the
scale, and one of the group members is at the
higher end of the scale (Harrison & Klein,
2007). In addition, a heuristic method based on
the conceptualization of disparity by Harrison
and Klein (2007) was used to compare the re-
sults. The groups were divided in three catego-
ries: minimum, medium, and maximum dispar-
ity. Four groups had minimum disparity (groups
in which the majority of the group members had
a high cognitive complexity and groups in
which all group members had approximately
the same level of cognitive complexity). Twenty-
seven groups had medium cognitive disparity
(groups in which the individual cognitive com-
plexity ranged from low to high and the differ-
ences were compressed). Thirteen groups had
maximum cognitive disparity (groups in which
only one of the members had a very high cog-
nitive complexity); see also Harrison & Klein,
2007, Figure 1).
Results
The results of this study are reported at two
levels of analysis. Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 6
concerned the group level of analysis, while
Hypotheses 4 and 5 concerned variables evalu-
ated at the individual level of analysis (satisfac-
tion and equal participation). Table 2 shows the
means, standard deviations, and correlations for
the aggregated variables (group level of analy-
sis), while Table 3 shows the means, standard
deviations, and correlations for the individual
level of analysis.
To test Hypothesis 1, a stepwise regression
analysis was performed, with gender variety
introduced in the first step and cognitive dispar-
ity introduced in the second step as predictors
for the time needed to reach consensus in the
cognitive mapping. The results of this regres-
sion analysis are presented in Table 4. In
Model 2, the standardized beta coefficient for
cognitive disparity is positive and significant,
while the standardized beta coefficient for gen-
der variety is positive, but not significant. The F
change when disparity is introduced in the
model is significant [F(1, 41)  13.49, p 
.001]; therefore, we can conclude that Hypoth-
Table 1
Within Group Agreement Indices (Rwg)
N Min. Max. M SD
Rwg equal participation
within groups 44 .75 1.00 .86 .06
Rwg quality of teamwork
processes 44 .75 1.00 .84 .07
Rwg satisfaction 44 .75 1.00 .85 .08
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esis 1 which predicts that both group disparity
and variety will have a positive impact on the
time needed to reach consensus, and the effect
of disparity will be the stronger of the two is
supported.
A second regression analysis was conducted
to test Hypotheses 2 and 3, and the results are
presented in Table 5. In this regression analysis,
the dependent variable was the complexity of
the group cognitive map, while the independent
ones are gender variety and cognitive disparity.
Hypothesis 2 states that gender variety has a
positive impact on group’s cognitive complex-
ity, and as shown by the positive standardized
beta coefficient, it is marginally supported. Hy-
pothesis 3 states that cognitive disparity has a
negative impact on group’s cognitive complex-
ity. This hypothesis also received only marginal
support since the standardized beta coefficient is
indeed negative, but only marginally signifi-
cant.
In the operationalization of disparity,
Harrison and Klein (2007) argue that the use of
a coefficient of variation to compute disparity
induces the effect of a particular moderating
structure of within-group data and therefore
they recommend to use a modified regression
equation in which the hidden effect of the mean
Table 2
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for the Group Level of Analysis
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Gender variety .21 .26
2. Cognitive disparity .35 .15 .02
3. Average ICC 2.88 .74 .22 .21
4. Group CC 2.64 1.11 .21 .25 .56**
5. Equal participation
within groups 3.88 .51 .13 .28 .11 .31*
6. Quality of
teamwork
processes 3.92 .59 .10 .32* .01 .42** .83**
7. Satisfaction 3.85 .55 .12 .18 .04 .39** .79** .72**
8. Time to reach
consensus 23.36 6.39 .21 .49** .21 .17 .01 .10 .05
Note. ICC  individual cognitive complexity; CC  cognitive complexity; N  44 groups.
* p  .05. ** p  .01.
Table 3
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for the Individual Level of Analysis
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Age 20.16 1.95
2. Gender 1.56 .49 .10
3. Equal participation
within groups 3.86 .64 .01 .08
4. Quality of
teamwork
processes 3.90 .72 .01 .05 .71**
5. Satisfaction 3.84 .76 .04 .16 .63** .64**
6. Time to make the
individual
cognitive map 33.94 7.58 .06 .03 .13 .18* .24**
7. ICC 2.89 1.17 .03 .04 .02 .07 .03 .02
8. Difference
between individual
and group CC .25 1.29 .01 .01 .24** .24** .21* .14 .59**
Note. ICC  individual cognitive complexity; CC  cognitive complexity; N  132 respondents.
* p  .05. ** p  .01.
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is controlled for. In line with this reasoning, we
rearranged the regression equation used to test
Hypothesis 3 as:





where AICC is average cognitive complexity
within groups. A similar strategy was used for
the time to reach consensus. The value for b3
reflects the “clean” effect of cognitive disparity
on the cognitive complexity of the groups. The
results of the two rearranged regression equa-
tions are presented in Table 6 (only the stan-
dardized beta coefficients from Model 3 with all
the predictors included in the equation are pre-
sented in the table). The results of the rear-
ranged regression equations show support for
Hypothesis 3 in the sense that the effect of
cognitive disparity (corrected for the effect of
the mean AICC) on GCC is positive and signif-
icant. However, the results for the time to reach
consensus were not fully supported and the
“clean” effect of disparity on the time groups
need to reach agreement on the structure of the
cognitive map is positive, but not statistically
significant. A possible explanation is the hidden
effect of within unit moderating factors (e.g.,
AICC interacts with cognitive disparity in the
sense that the groups that need the most time to
reach consensus are the groups with high AICC
scores and high scores on cognitive disparity).
To further check the operationalization of
disparity, we conducted an additional set of
analyses. Starting from the alternative concep-
tualization of group disparity, we heuristically
divided our sample in three subgroups based on
the distribution of individual cognitive com-
plexities within each group. In order to check if
the relationship between cognitive disparity and
group cognitive complexity is indeed linear, we
plotted the scores of group cognitive complex-
ity based on this distinction. The results are
presented in Figure 1.
The results using the second form of opera-
tionalization show a reversed U-shaped relation
between groups’ cognitive disparity and
groups’ cognitive complexity, with the highest
level of complexity for groups with moderate
levels of cognitive disparity (see Figure 2).
When the coefficient of variation was used as
operationalization of disparity, the relation be-
tween the groups’ cognitive disparity and
groups’ cognitive complexity is negative and
linear. These differences raise the question
whether the second operationalization of dispar-
ity as presented in Harrison and Klein (2007) is
accurate.
Hypotheses 4 and 5 were the only hypotheses
for which the data were analyzed at the individ-
ual level. In order to test these hypotheses, we
artificially split the sample based on the differ-
ence between the ICC and GCC. We used the
Table 4
Results of the Regression Analysis for Time to
Reach Consensus
Model 1 Model 2
1. Gender variety .21 .20
2. Cognitive disparity .49***
R .21 .53**
Adj. R square .05 .25
F change 1.95 13.49***
* p  .10. ** p  .05. *** p  .01
Table 5




1. Gender variety .23*
2. Cognitive disparity .26*
R .34*
Adj. R square .08
* p  .10. ** p  .05. *** p  .01
Table 6
Results of the Rearranged Regression Equations for
Time to Reach Consensus (TC) and Group
Cognitive Complexity
TC (Model 3) GCC (Model 3)
1. SD AICC .05 .79
2. 1/Mean AICC .28 .10
3. CV AICC .60 .92*
R .54*** .47***
Adj. R square .24 .16
Note. SD AICC  standard deviation average individual
cognitive complexity; CV AICC  coefficient of variation
for AICC (cognitive disparity).
* p  .10. ** p  .05. *** p  .01.
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mean and standard deviation of the differences
between GCC and ICC to obtain three sub-
groups: the first with an ICC lower than the
GCC (lower than the mean minus a standard
deviation, N  22), the second with an ICC
approximately equal to the GCC (one standard
deviation around the mean, N  88), and the
third with an ICC higher than the GCC (higher
than the mean plus a standard deviation, N 
22). Hypothesis 4 stated that group members
with a higher CC than the group’s CC will be
less satisfied about teamwork quality as com-
pared with members with a lower individual CC
than the group’s CC. A t test for independent
samples was computed in order to test it. Group
members with a CC lower than the Group CC
report a higher satisfaction (M  3.84, SD 
.64) than the members with a CC higher than
the group CC (M  3.43, SD  1.18). The
difference, however, is not statistically signifi-
cant t(42)  1.42 ( p  .16); therefore, Hypoth-
esis 4 is not supported. Hypothesis 5 stated that
the participation to the task will be perceived as
being less equal by group members with an ICC
higher than the GCC as compared with mem-
bers with a lower ICC than the GCC. It was
tested using a similar procedure as for satisfac-
tion. The results support this hypothesis, show-
ing that group members with a higher ICC than
the GCC are less satisfied (M  3.50,
SD  1.03) and perceive the individual contri-
butions to the group task as less equal than the
group members with an ICC lower than GCC
(M  4.04, SD  .53), t(42)  2.19 ( p  .03).
In order to test Hypothesis 6, a hierarchical
regression was conducted. In the first step,
group cognitive complexity was regressed to
both average individual cognitive complexity
and quality of teamwork processes. The cross-
product term was introduced in the second step
of the regression. Multicollinearity can be a
problem especially in small samples; therefore,
in order to facilitate the interpretation of the
results and reduce the multicollinearity (see for
details Aiken & West, 1991), the cross-product
term was computed based on the centered val-
ues for teamwork quality and average ICC. The
centered scores were computed by subtracting















Figure 1. Group cognitive complexity as a function of cognitive disparity operationalized as
minimum, medium, and high.
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teamwork quality and average ICC. The results
are presented in Table 7.
The average individual cognitive complexity
has a positive effect on group cognitive com-
plexity, a result which is consistent with the
results reported by Hendrick (1979). Further, as
expected, the quality of teamwork processes has
also a positive impact on group cognitive com-
plexity. The cross-product term introduced in
the second step also has a significant effect.
Therefore, the impact of the interaction between
average ICC and teamwork quality on GCC is
significant. As shown in Figure 2, the groups
with the highest cognitive complexity are those
whose members have highly complex maps and
experienced effective teamwork processes
while working as a group. In addition, we per-
formed a t test for simple slopes to check for the
difference in the impact of average ICC depend-
ing on the quality of teamwork. The t test for
simple slopes was computed by rearranging the
regression equations into simple regressions of
group cognitive complexity on average ICC for
conditional values of teamwork quality (see for
details, Aiken & West, 1991). When the team-
work quality is high (higher than the mean for
the entire sample), the impact of average ICC
on GCC was positive and significant (b  .72,
t  4.55, p  .0001). When teamwork quality is
low (lower than the mean for the entire sample),
the impact is still positive and significant, but
much lower than in the first case (b  .45,
t  2.33, p  .03). Based on the results from the
t test for simple slopes, it can be concluded that
the positive impact of average ICC on GCC is
significantly accentuated under high teamwork
quality conditions. Therefore, Hypothesis 6 is
fully supported.
Discussion
In this study we set out to explore the impli-
cations of group diversity and teamwork pro-
cesses on the cognitive complexity of groups.
More specifically, we examined to what extent
group diversity (as variety and disparity), team-
work processes, and the average ICC within
groups explain the complexity of the conceptual
networks for collaboration developed by
groups. Concerning group diversity, we started
from a taxonomy introduced by Harrison and
Klein (2007) and argued that group diversity as
variety (gender variety) is beneficial, while
group diversity as disparity is detrimental for
GCC. We also argued that group disparity has
negative implications for the individual group
members because it is associated with dissatis-
faction and perception of unequal participation
to the group task. With respect to GCC, we
argued in line with other group cognition schol-
ars that it is explained both by ICC and team-




















Figure 2. The regression slopes for the interaction effect
of teamwork processes quality and average individual cog-
nitive complexity (CC) on group cognitive complexity.
ICC  individual cognitive complexity; GCC  group
cognitive complexity.
Table 7
Results of the Regression Analysis for the
Interaction of Teamwork Processes and Individual





1. Quality of teamwork processes .43*** .45***
Average ICC .57*** .56***
2. Teamwork quality  Average ICC .23**
R .71*** .74***
Adj. R square .50 .54
F change 20.91*** 3.74**
Note. ICC  individual cognitive complexity; CC  cog-
nitive complexity, the cross-product term was computed
based on the centered values of quality of teamwork pro-
cesses and average ICC.
* p  .10. ** p  .05. *** p  .01.
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we collected data from 44 groups using multiple
methods. Unlike most of the previous research
on group cognition, we evaluated GCC as a
group-level variable and used a cognitive map-
ping technique to elicit and represent the con-
ceptual networks for collaboration. Prior, the
same method was used to investigate the way in
which individual group members make sense of
collaboration. A questionnaire was used after-
ward to investigate the quality of teamwork
processes, group members’ satisfaction, and
their perceptions of individual participation to
the group’s task.
As predicted by Hypothesis 1, we found that
highly diverse groups need more time to reach
consensus in a cognitive mapping session and
that the strongest impact is obtained for group
diversity as disparity. When asked to create a
map for collaboration, groups in which only one
individual had a highly complex representation
about collaboration needed more time to reach
consensus than groups in which the cognitive
complexity was evenly distributed. The asym-
metrical distribution of a highly valued asset for
groups (individual cognitive complexity) leads
to long debates. This result is in line with the
predictions of conversion theory of minority
influence (Moscovici, 1980), which states that
the presence of an informed (in the terms of our
article—highly complex) minority in a group
leads to a greater cognitive activity in the group,
with the minority trying to persuade the other
group members.
Groups high on disparity ended up with
group cognitive maps that were less complex
than groups low on disparity. When looking at
the individual level, the group members with an
ICC higher than the GCC were less satisfied and
perceived the contribution of the individual
group members to the task as more unequal than
did those group members with an ICC lower
than the GCC. At the systemic level, these re-
sults suggest that group disparity is detrimental
to group effectiveness, both in terms of perfor-
mance (GCC) and satisfaction. As theoretically
stated by Harrison and Klein (2007) group dis-
parity is indeed associated with process losses
(the correlation between the quality of team-
work processes and cognitive disparity is
.32), with unequal participation to the task
(r  .28), and it creates frustration and dis-
satisfaction among those individuals that have a
high ICC. Although the grouping of individuals
according to their ICC relative to the GCC
ignores the impact of the within group interper-
sonal interactions and interdependencies, these
results can be used to argue that (1) the cogni-
tive disparity was negatively perceived among
group members (see the lower scores on satis-
faction and perception of equal participation)
and (2) the conversion theory of minority influ-
ence yields valid predictions concerning the im-
plications of cognitive disparity on groups’ cog-
nitive complexity. Therefore, future theoretical
developments should connect these two previ-
ously disparate research traditions: group diver-
sity and minority influence, in order to further
explore the implications of cognitive disparity
on groups’ cognitive complexity. Also, in a
more practical vein, future research should ex-
plore the ways in which the negative effects of
disparity can be controlled for in real groups.
Previous research shows that the negative ef-
fects of expertise disparity on group perfor-
mance in problem-solving tasks can be counter-
balanced if the group members with a low ex-
pertise will value the contribution of the
member(s) with the highest expertise (see for
details, Bonner, 2004). In conclusion, if cogni-
tive disparity is acknowledged by the group
members and the most knowledgeable member
is allowed to take the lead, the negative impact
of disparity can be attenuated.
Group variety has the opposite effects on
GCC as compared to group disparity. In this
study gender diversity was used as a proxy for
group variety in collaboration experiences and
attitudes, with the assumption that men and
women have qualitatively different experiences
with collaboration and so gender can be used as
a variety-relevant attribute. Our results indeed
show that gender variety has a positive influ-
ence on GCC. However, according to most
group diversity scholars (Milliken & Martins,
1996; Pelled, 1996; Van Knippenberg et al.,
2004; William & O’Reilly, 1998), gender is
also likely to trigger social categorization pro-
cess and the use of stereotypes in interpersonal
interactions. Therefore, it is expected that gen-
der diversity will ultimately impede group pro-
cesses. The small and negative correlation be-
tween gender variety and quality of teamwork
processes offers partial support for this propo-
sition. It can therefore be concluded that gender
diversity has a positive impact on GCC because
(1) gender is in this instance an attribute highly
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relevant for the task and (2) associated with
variety. Gender diversity, however, may have
disruptive effects for teamwork processes be-
cause it triggers social categorization processes
and therefore is also associated with separa-
tion. One attribute can at the same time stand
more than one type of diversity as described
by Harrison and Klein (2007). Therefore, the
most important challenge for management is
how to highlight the positive effects of
knowledge variety and to reduce the negative
effects of disparity or separation associated
with a particular attribute (e.g., gender or
race).
The core result of this article refers to the
moderator role of teamwork quality in the rela-
tionship between average ICC and GCC. There-
fore, it puts a key claim of group cognition
research to test. Previous research started from
the assumption that the elaboration of task rel-
evant information is increased if group mem-
bers have complex knowledge structures (e.g.,
Hendrick, 1979). Our study confirms these re-
sults showing that the average ICC within
groups has a positive impact on GCC. However,
the average ICC interacts with the quality of
teamwork processes in determining GCC, in the
sense that groups with a high average ICC have
the highest GCC if they experience high quality
teamwork processes. The group members that
have complex representations about collabora-
tion construct the most complex group concep-
tual network for collaboration if they interact in
an effective way and if they experience as few
process losses as possible.
Group cognition scholars argue that team-
work processes are relevant for the development
of team cognition (Rentsch & Woehr, 2004;
Salas & Fiore, 2004). Group cognition emerges
as a group-level phenomenon from the interplay
between the knowledge structures of the group
members and the interaction processes that take
place within groups (Curşeu, 2006). Although
group cognition has been theoretically de-
scribed as a group-level phenomenon, it was
rarely investigated as such. Most of the research
focused on aggregating group members’ cogni-
tions in order to predict group performance and
ignored the interaction processes altogether.
The present study went a step further and cap-
tured group interactions both in the method to
elicit and evaluate GCC and in the role of team-
work processes in GCC. Therefore, GCC was
explored in the present study as a characteristic
of group cognition that emerges from the inter-
play between the individual knowledge struc-
tures and the quality of interpersonal interac-
tions inside the group.
Theoretical, Methodological, and
Practical Implications
Based on our results it can be argued that
group disparity influences the group outcomes
through teamwork processes, an argument that
is also in line with the open system models
of group effectiveness (Gladstein, 1984;
Hackman, 1987; McGrath, 1984). However, the
mediation models of group effectiveness are as
important as the open system models because
other factors (e.g., emergent states like cohe-
sion, trust, potency) seem to mediate the impact
of group diversity on group effectiveness (Ilgen,
Hollenbeck, Johnson, & Jundt, 2005; Jung &
Sosik, 1999; Marks, Mathieu, & Zaccaro,
2001). Therefore, an interesting research direc-
tion will be to test the extent to which teamwork
processes and emergent states mediate the im-
pact of group disparity on group effectiveness
and how group disparity impacts on specific
teamwork processes (see, e.g., the distinction
between transition phase processes and action
phase processes Marks et al., 2001), as well as
the emergent states.
As mentioned before, our study argues that a
diversity attribute can be related to more than
only one diversity type as described by Harrison
and Klein (2007). This raises the question of
how to interpret an attribute exclusively in
terms of variety, disparity, or separation. The
practical implication is that in order to increase
the GCC group leaders or managers should fo-
cus on increasing variety as much as possible
and decreasing separation and disparity within
their groups. Moreover, because a single at-
tribute can be related to more than one type of
diversity, it is important to note that group va-
riety should not be increased in a way that
increases disparity or separation simulta-
neously.
Another issue concerns the alternative opera-
tionalization of group disparity suggested by
Harrison and Klein (2007). They suggest that
the coefficient of variation is a good indicator of
disparity because high values for the coefficient of
variation are obtained if a single member in a
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group has a high score on a certain scale, while
others have low scores. The same arguments were
provided by Bedeian and Mossholder (2000), who
showed that the theoretical maximum for the co-
efficient of variation is obtained when all cases in
a group have zero values except one. On the other
hand, Harrison and Klein (2007) suggest another
operationalization for disparity (maximum dispar-
ity if one group member is situated at the top of
the scale, while the others are situated at the lower
levels, medium disparity if all group members are
equally distributed along the scale and minimum
disparity if the majority of the members are situ-
ated at the top of the scale, or all members are
situated at the same level of the scale—low, me-
dium or high). When we divided our sample ac-
cording to this second operationalization of dis-
parity, the pattern of results changed dramatically
(see Figure 1). The results show that the relation-
ship between disparity and GCC using this opera-
tionalization of disparity has an inverted U shape.
The small number of groups in the extreme groups
(for low disparity, N  4, and for high disparity,
N  13) suggests that these results should be
interpreted with caution. We conclude that the
operationalization of disparity is not yet com-
pletely clear and future research is needed in order
to extensively test the two operationalizations in
parallel.
Our study shows that GCC is a group-level
phenomenon that emerges from the interaction
between the group members, and as a conse-
quence, it depends both on the ICC of the group
members as well as on their interaction while
performing the task. Any attempt to explore the
cognitive complexity of groups should therefore
satisfy the criteria proposed by Bar-Tal (1990)
for the evaluation of group-level phenomena.
First, they should address the group as a whole.
Second, group members’ agreement with regard
to the construct must be demonstrated. Third,
the construct must discriminate between groups
and finally the origin of the construct must
reflect group interaction processes (Bar-Tal,
1990). The cognitive-mapping technique that
was used to investigate GCC in the present
article satisfies all these essential criteria for
group-level evaluations. In order to investigate
GCC further, the use of this technique, as well
as other methods that satisfy the above men-
tioned criteria, is welcomed.
The effect of the interaction between team-
work processes and average ICC on GCC also
has straightforward practical implications. It is
obvious that in order to get the best out of a
group it is necessary, but not sufficient, to bring
together the most knowledgeable members. It is
also highly relevant to make sure that interac-
tion processes that occur while working at the
task are highly effective. Process facilitation
interventions and measures might enhance the
extent to which the group as a whole uses the
cognitive resources of its members in order to
get the best possible outcomes.
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204 CURŞEU, SCHRUIJER, AND BOROŞ
Appendix A Appendix B
A Taxonomy of Types of Relations Identified
in the Cognitive Maps (adapted from Gómez,
Moreno, Pazos, & Sierra-Alonso, 2000)
Gómez et al. (2000) discussed the process of
conceptualization as a critical element in every
problem-solving activity. The authors presented
a framework for conceptual modeling in which
they described several types of possible relations
between concepts (relations are interconnections be-
tween concepts in a conceptual network). Seven
types of connections are particularly relevant for the
case of cognitive maps (for a detailed discussion, see
Gómez et al., 2000, p. 174).
Causal relations (CA) describe how a given action
or phenomenon induces (determines) another state,
action, or event (e.g., A is the cause of B, A needs B,
A fires B, if A than B) or describe the conditions or
actions are followed by consequences or reactions
(e.g., A enables B, A needs B).
Association (ASO) describes how two or more
concepts are correlated (e.g., A is related or associ-
ated to B, A is connected to B, A is in contact with
B) or describes combination of concepts (e.g., A and
B are combined to. . .).
Equivalence (EQ) establishes the equality be-
tween two or more apparently different concepts,
including similarity (establishes which concepts are
similar or analogue and to what extent; e.g., A 
B  C, A is similar to B).
Topological (TOP) relations describe the spatial
distribution of concepts representing physical items
(e.g., A is above B, A is to the right of B, A is inside
B).
Structural (STR) relations describe how a concept
or a group of concepts can be decomposed into parts
(also inclusion/exclusion relations, A is a part of B, A
and B are parts of C), or describe how several con-
cepts share a common trait or are united by a com-
mon element (A, B, and C share common elements).
Chronological (CHR) relations describe the way
two or more concepts are related in a time sequence
(e.g., A occurs before B, A and B occur simulta-
neously, A occurs during B, A starts before B ends).
Hierarchical (HIE) relations describe the categor-
ical relation between concepts (one or several ele-
ments are subordinated to one or several others) (e.g.,
A is subordinated to B; A, B and C are subordinated
to D), or describe taxonomic relations (e.g., A can be
classified as B, C, and D).
(Appendix continues)
Table 8
A List of Concepts Related to Collaboration








































38. Defensive reactions 3
39. Inflexibility 3
40. Conflict 3
























































































Legend: The coding of the cognitive map
Concepts used =35
Connections = 32
Types of relations = 4 (ASO, CA, STR, EQ)
Complexity of the map = 65.3
35
4*32 =
Figure 3. Example of a group cognitive map, the coding scheme, and the formula to
compute cognitive complexity.
206 CURŞEU, SCHRUIJER, AND BOROŞ
